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Abstract
Natural resources, by their nature, are not readily bent to the status of private
property. Efficient resource use is complicated by jurisdictional externalities,
public goods, non-use values and beneficiaries spatially separated from the
location of resources. The task is made more challenging by ecological
complexity which obscures cause (benefits) and effects (costs), dramatic time lags
between individual actions and subsequent social consequences which, together
with substantial uncertainty, introduce the chance of irreversibilities. Resource
economists have played a major role in the literature on externalities, the
development of individual transferable quotas, non-market valuation techniques
and common property management.4
The first of mankind had in common all those  things which
God had given to the human race. This community was not a
positive community of interest...It was a...negative community,
which resulted from the fact that those things which were common
to all belonged no more to one than to the others, and hence no one
could prevent another from taking of these common things that
portion which he judged necessary in order to subserve his
wants....[M]en partitioned among themselves the earth and the
greater part of those things which were on its surface...this process
is the origin of the right of property. Some things, however, did not
enter into this division, and remain therefore to this day in the
condition of the ancient and negative community.
Pothier, discussing the legal
character of animals ferae naturae,
in  Traité du Droit de Propriété
(No. 21), as quoted in Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1895)5
I. Introduction
Natural resources in general and renewable resources in particular provide
a rich intellectual challenge for five reasons, all related to the interplay of poorly
defined property rights externalities and market failure. These make up a core
theme in the paper.
First, renewable resources have had a persistent open access status as the
above quote suggests. Poorly defined property rights are both the cause and
consequence of the characteristics of the resources and its services which give rise
to the externalities discussed in Section II. To illustrate, creating private property
for transboundary resources in a manner designed to assure efficient use may not
be possible. Consequently the commercial harvest of blue whales by one party
increases the harvest cost ---- (a stock externality discussed in Section III) and
decreases the “non-use” (public good) values of today’s and tomorrow’s viewers.
Renewable resources don’t have a monopoly on externalities but in Coase (1960),
arguably all the examples are drawn from the realm of renewable resources;
grazing, water, noise and air pollution for example. Due to ubiquitous
externalities, traditional reliance on market prices as scarcity indicators of
resources  in situ is foreclosed, thus introducing a challenging layer of
complication to the applied analysis of optimal allocation of renewable resources,
particularly in the setting of decentralized decision making. One response has
been the development of a research area which studies collective self-
management by individuals using resources in common, See Section V The study6
of common property resources is a distinctive contribution by resource
economists to the discipline. At the macroeconomic level, missing or seriously
distorted prices have substantial ramifications for national income accounting
giving rise to “green” accounts and to measuring economic growth properly
(Section VII).
Second, by their nature, resources are capital and must be studied in an
intertemporal setting. An important distinguishing feature of renewable resources
is periodic natural accretion or depletion, either from growth or spatial movement
(Section III). In this section a distinction is made between characterizing growth
for resources like fish, for which the population is the organizing unit and timber
represented by the growth of a tree. Optimal duration (rotation) is the focal point
for timber; rate of harvest for fish. Also included in Sec. III is the role natural
resources has played in growth models. So far the role is  de minimis and it
remains to be discovered if the omission is costly in terms of understanding
economic growth better. Perhaps even more important for natural resource capital
is the fact that the future counts, and its associated uncertainty cannot be lightly
dismissed. Extinguishing a renewable natural resource, unlike normal capital,
creates a fundamental irreversibility. Species once lost cannot be created again,
given contemporary knowledge. See Sec VIII. Missing contingent futures
markets, exacerbated by all too frequent open access status, provide compelling
evidence that the timing of extinction has not been and will not be optimal.7
Third, there is an essential spatial component to living resources. Biota of
the same species spatially differentiate themselves and sometimes are then linked
together by more or less well defined corridors, as when larvae collect from many
separate sources in common pools, then disperse to separate colonies. The
peripatetic nature of many renewable resources often makes it prohibitively
expensive to bend them suitably into the status of private property. More about
this essential yet unexplored topic will be discussed in Section VI.
Fourth, three major chronological themes in the history of natural
resources in the United States are acquisition, disposal and management.
Government continues to play a major role in the stewardship of renewable
resources. The complex set of interdependent services natural resources provide,
illustrated in the next section, make it difficult to create private ownership, avoid
externalities and achieve efficient use. Even when there is private property, public
and private ownership of renewable resources are interwoven, as in the case of
privately owned mineral rights throughout the public lands in the United States.
More than one-third of the land in the United States is owned by the federal
government, states or smaller public jurisdictions. About one-half of the land in
California and Nevada is publicly owned.
Regulating resource use is a natural focal point for study. Government acts
directly as a substantial owner of resources and indirectly through the policies
implemented for other purposes which have an inadvertent impact on the quantity
and quality of resources. In Section IV particular attention is paid to the8
development of individual transferable quotas, a mechanism for privatizing rights
to an --- open access resource. The creation of this institution is a major
contribution renewable resource economists can claim. However the length of its
gestation period was troublingly long.
Because of the predisposition of economists to favor narrowly defined
efficiency goals, it should come as no surprise that applied economists have
attacked public policies antithetical to conservation. Benefit cost analysis was
developed by economists in response to the need for more efficient decisions
regarding water resource development (and defense). Economists concluded that
fewer water projects should be constructed, fewer forests harvested, fewer fish
harvested, less effluent discharged into water bodies and emissions into the air.
All of these recommendations are music to the ears of conservationists who
typically think we do the work of the devil.
Fifth, the benefits of big policy issues such as preserving the Grand
Canyon, and other natural wonders, maintaining habitats for endangered species
and charismatic megafauna, and protecting the global commons are largely non-
market, non-use and with a heavy emphasis on future value. By their nature, they
are not readily susceptible to valuation by studying markets, since well
functioning markets don’t accurately capture the preservation value of species, a
public good, to cite one example. The issue for the empirical discipline of
economics is to decide if it wants to play in these policy arenas or to opt out on
the methodological ground that only observed direct or indirect market behavior9
is acceptable. Non-market and non-use values are not the private domain of
researchers studying renewable resources. However, they are the ones who have
developed non-market valuation methods. The fate of these resources will turn
critically on the professional legitimacy of non-market valuation methods in the
years to come.
II. Causes, Consequences and Measurement of Externalities
The major source of externalities can be traced to various impediments
which prevent the establishment of property rights. (Baumol and Oates, 1988)
Property rights allow appropriability. Hicks (1983) focuses our attention on the
consequences of poor property rights: “In order that a thing should have a price, it
must be appropriable, but it is not necessary that a thing should be appropriable
for it to be a factor of production.”
The divergence between value and opportunity cost is apparent in the
absence of appropriability. To understand the nature of this discrepancy requires
the careful exploration of the particular information, transaction costs, monitoring
and enforcement mechanisms that lead either to the discovery of an appropriate
solution to a particular resource setting or to imperfect property rights.
In this section I identify a non-exhaustive collection of characteristics
which make it difficult to create efficient markets for natural resources and their
goods and service flow. They are (1) jurisdictional externalities; (2) public goods
and non-use values; (3) public goods for which the location of beneficiaries and
cost bearers are spatially separated; (4) ecological complexity which obscures10
cause (benefits) and effect (costs); (5) dramatic time lags between individual
actions and subsequent social consequences; and (6) the unintended, unforseen,
environmental consequences of public policies pursuing non-environmental
objectives.
Renewable resources are notorious for their disrespect for political
boundaries extending across or traversing over them. Such jurisdictional
externalities make private ownership difficult and public management including
choice of tools a challenge.2 Regulating floods and water quality and quantity
along the Mississippi River requires coordination among the ten states it courses
from source to sea. The Danube River passes through ten countries on its way to
the Black Sea around which are  six countries which bear substantial damage
annually to fisheries, recreation and human health from pollution contributed by
the countries riparian to the Danube. Salt concentrations have accumulated in the
U.S. portion of the Colorado River to a level which makes the water guaranteed
by treaty, if applied, destructive to the agricultural land in Mexico. Emissions
from coal-fired plants in the U.S. or Poland interact to produce acid rain which
damages coniferous forests in Canada or Sweden respectively. Waterfowl and fish
during different life stages travel thousands, sometimes tens of thousands of
kilometers as they follow migratory patterns through countries and global
commons. Waterfowl of beneficial interest to hunters in the U.S. depend on
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wetlands in Canada for a breeding and rearing habitat.3 Waterfowl and their
migratory habits stymie private ownership, enhance the difficulty of valuation and
the determination of the optimal path of use as well as the design of optimal
prices for right of use.
Applied analysis is further made difficult because the probability of
species extinction depends crucially on the quantity and quality of resources as in
the case of several salmonid species endangered, in part, by low flows and higher
temperatures of the Columbia River. From an economic perspective, the optimal
allocation of water for instream flows to support salmonids turns on how we value
enhancing the probability of survival of these species. These are fundamentally
non-use values and their estimation strikes at the doctrinal heart of the economic
profession today. Illustratively, non-use values refer to value placed on the
preservation of species in the future “for reasons peculiarly our own” [Mann and
Plummer (1995)]—existence value—or perhaps because we value knowing that
our kith and kin as well as others will have an opportunity to experience these
species [Krutilla (1967a), Ciriacy-Wantrup (1968)].
Presently there is no existing market, direct or indirect, from which non-
use values can be estimated. This puts economics, an empirical discipline engaged
in studying refutable hypotheses, at a crossroads. We can continue to admit only
behavioral observations—preferences revealed directly or indirectly by “market
                                                
3 Lest one think there surely is a clear case only for public management, U.S. members of
Ducks Unlimited contribute millions of dollars to lease duck habitat in Canada. The members are12
transactions,” in which case resource allocation decisions turning on non-use
value are outside of economics as Hausman (1993) maintains.4 Alternatively, the
discipline can broaden its horizon to encourage further development and
refinement of contingent valuation, stated preference analysis and other non-
market methods [NOAA Panel (1993), Mitchell and Carson (1989)].5
Philosophy and psychology have moved away from the behavioral straight
jacket of earlier decades in order to understand better the complexities of the real
world. Profit maximizing firms continue to spend substantial sums of money to
learn about household preferences for bundles of product qualities they have
never experienced. In response to this demand, marketing has developed and
refined survey techniques and estimation procedures. If economics decides for
doctrinal reasons not to draw on and extend this body of knowledge to address
non-use values, it will find itself increasingly irrelevant in major public policy
issues of the day. As Sen said, “The conflict between relevance and simplicity of
use is indeed a hard one in economic measurement and evaluation, but it is
difficult to see why simplicity of use should have such priority over relevance.”
Understanding and resolving the issue of preserving charismatic
megafauna in Africa involves sorting out an elaborate concatenation of
phenomena. North Americans and Europeans appear to obtain substantial
                                                                                                                                    
“paying for” the spatially undifferentiated enhancement of waterfowl populations, some of which
they will never see.
4 Sen (1973) pointedly recounts the exchange between two behaviorists with the first one
saying, “I see you are very well. How am I?”
5  See the symposium on contingent valuation in the Journal of Economic Perspectives
(Fall 1994) for alternative views.13
enjoyment knowing that the “Big Five,” the rhinoceros, elephants, lions, buffalo
and hippopotamus will continue to exist in the future for all to enjoy. These non-
use benefits of preservation accrue to people located primarily in the North but
the costs of preservation are incurred by those in the South. As for use value,
payments by visitors to wild game parks do not cover the marginal short run cost
of parks. Revenues such as they are, typically do not accrue to those who bear the
costs of the populations of  megafauna. When they migrate outside the park,
competing for habitat, they threaten and injure the African peasants. Elephants
killed at least 500 people in Zimbabwe in a recent seven-year period. Elephants
have been likened to a swarm of six ton locusts each eating over 300 pounds of
food per day. Under these circumstances, there is a substantial hurdle to surmount
when designing an economically sensible and politically feasible solution in
which at least no one is worse off and some are better off.
Common to most externalities is technical interdependence in that the
actions of one agent impinge on a resource which then has consequences for
others. Worrisome to many is the failure of most economic models to address the
complex technical interdependence of ecosystems. We recognize the song with
the lines “The headbone is connected to the neckbone...” and so on down to the
toes, Yet our models resemble stick figure portrayals of life. The number of
articles in economics journals which extend resource technical interdependence
beyond two natural resources -even one- is meager. Yet there is substantial
qualitative evidence from the ecological literature that complexity among flora14
and fauna is real. It is of relatively little analytical consequence if we foreshorten
the dimension of the systems we study. However, concern mounts to the degree
that economists treat their models as more than a metaphor and ascribe greater
reality to them and their prescriptions than is empirically justified. Too often there
are no cautions noted or tests of (or apologies for) the consequences of omitted
variables and bias resulting from omitting equations describing natural
production.
Compounding the difficulty of treating externalities empirically is the
timing of actions and consequences. The natural process often takes time. The
subsidence of land today is the result of groundwater withdrawn many decades
ago. Fossil fuels burned today produce gases, including carbon dioxide, that the
predominant scientific community believes will cause global climate change in
one hundred years time and further into the horizon.6 Expected damages, run in
the hundreds of billions of dollars annually. These estimates do not include
individuals’ valuation of possible dramatic changes in ecosystems. Slow growing
species, rescued on the cusp of extinction take decades and longer to recover.
Accompanying distantly dated damages is substantial uncertainty about
prospective costs and benefits of alternative resource decisions and the possibility
of irreversibility. There surely are many people who believe the stakes to be so
high and our understanding of the perceived negative consequences so slim that
the usual benefit-cost procedures are too imprecise to be very useful. Under these
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circumstances, Kneese (1973), addressing the issue of nuclear power and waste
storage, recommended that marching orders should then emanate from one or
more public forums in instances where there are low probabilities of very big
losses not accurately measurable by their very nature.
Governments often pursue  policies which create or intensify negative
externalities incident on natural resources. One of the spectacular contemporary
examples is the management of fisheries throughout the world using subsidies
which encourage entry and result in serious depletion of the world’s fish stocks.
FAO (1992) reports an annual cost of 42 billion dollars in excess of revenues
from sales of fish throughout the world. A lion’s share of this loss is incurred in
domestic fisheries which is amenable, in principle, to rational management.
Sometimes policies designed to achieve government objectives have
inadvertent consequences for other natural resources. Deacon (1994) has analyzed
how political stability affects rates of deforestation. The major causes of
deforesting rain forests in South America is (1) tax free agricultural income; (2)
subsidized land clearing for cattle ranchers;7 and (3) public road construction for
military purposes or to reach trading centers or new mines reduce the cost of
obtaining access to forests.8  These subsidies are so large in Brazil that Dasgupta
(1996) cites Binswanger’s (1991) claim that Brazil itself would be better off by
                                                                                                                                    
income.
7 Tax reduction is the reason for 72 percent of the funds invested in Amazonian cattle
ranches on deforested land in a fairly recent year [Kohlhepp (1980)].
8  Hyde et al. (forthcoming) cites a road project in Laos where he estimates the concession
to build came with the right to cut trees worth twenty years the dollar cost of the project.16
decreasing the rate of deforestation. In countries throughout the world, including
the United States, removing timber in the process of creating pasture is the means
a private owner legally proves ownership. Removal also is low cost evidence and
occupying the land. In the same vein and with the same consequences of
encouraging inefficiency, an appropriation water right (first in time, first in right)
in the western United States is secured by using it or losing it.
Other government “failures” include macroeconomic policies targeting
industry protection, exchange rates, export taxes, credit subsidies, etc. which have
a feedback loop resulting in inefficient groundwater extraction, soil erosion, forest
depletion, conversion of wildlife habitat and other economically unfavorable
consequences for ecosystems. Heath and Binswanger (1996) demonstrate
persuasively that politically motivated public investment patterns, credit policies
and tax policies designed with a “large farmer bias” cause natural resource
degradation. Identifying and estimating the opportunity costs of these policies is
our metier.
III. Renewable Resources Are Capital
Until comparatively recently, economists interested in  natural resources
lacked the mathematics background to solve the intertemporal dynamics problem
inherent in capital theory. Instead they used intuition based on training in static
economics. 
9  Adding in a time dimension is sufficiently difficult that many of the
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brightest in our profession got the wrong answers to questions such as the optimal
renewable resource stock. It therefore is appropriate to sketch out a very informal
model designed to capture many interesting features of renewable natural resource
allocation theory. A convenient point of reference is a representative model of a
fisheries problem treated at a very aggregated level. Suppose a benevolent central
planner has control over a fish population  (N) or many other types of natural
resource capital and is interested in maximizing the profit from its exploitation.
Harvest (h) from this population is sold at a constant price (P) at all times. Time
subscripts are omitted to reduce clutter. Harvest of the fish (a flow) from effort
(E) and the population (a stock) is governed by technology curious for economists
(1) h = EN.
This production function, originally specified by a fisheries biologist [Schaefer
(1954)], is remarkable for the rare times it has been modified in the literature to
satisfy economist’s concern for diminishing returns in the factors of production.
The form of equation (1) has attractive pedagogic features and is kept for that
reason. Specifying the technology as a function of the stock of the renewable
resource as is done in (1) introduces a stock externality [Smith (1968)], a critically
distinctive ingredient for understanding renewable resource management
prescriptions. See in particular how it plays a critical role in the discussion of
dynamic games (in section X). There is more to the harvest technology that
depends on its source (N) than meets many an eye and it is here where intuition is
likely to be led astray. Previewing future discussion: when is the optimal natural18
resource capital at a level where the traditional own rate of return is negative;
[where,  ¢ f N ( )< 0  in equation (5)]?
The total cost of harvest when effort can be purchased at a constant unit
cost w is found by rewriting (1) as
(2) c N ( )h =
wh
N
= wE , ¢  c  N ( )< 0.
10
For present purposes assume that the natural renewable population
dynamics, with harvest is governed by
(3) h N f N
dt
dN
- = = ) ( &
It is common place in theoretical ecology and in economics to treat population
growth of many fish and animal species as a logistic function







where r is the intrinsic rate of growth and  N  is the maximum population dictated
by food and space constraints. See Figure 1. In the absence of any limitations on
carrying capacity, the population grows without bound at rate r. No species in the
real world has grown continuously at a constant rate, the assumption too often
made by theorists “for convenience.” Theorems proved in models with this
feature must be judged by aesthetic criteria. For any species, there is a limit to
habitat. In one way or another, as a species grows, it exhibits diminishing returns,
                                                
10  All but a miniscule fraction of researchers have blithely disregarded the fact that most
fisheries in the world do not pay a wage rate but pay workers a share of the catch. Interesting
research topics are therefore obscured by such “simplifications” as heterogeneous labor and
homogeneous share contracts, for example.19
(5)
¢  f  N ( ) >
< 0 ,
¢  ¢  f  N ( )< 0.
The marginal product of a renewable natural resource obeying logistic growth is
exhibited in Figure 2. Natural resource economics differs from standard economic
growth theory in that ƒ(N) in (3) is bounded and there is no human population
growth.
The problem for the planner then is to maximize net revenue,





discounted at a positive discount rate, r, by choosing  h ‡ 0 and restricting  N ‡ 0
subject to the population dynamics constraint (3).
The canonical solution to this standard intertemporal constrained profit
maximization problem is found from form a current value Hamiltonian by
combining (6), (3) and (4) with l the costate variable,
(7) H = P - c N ( ) ( )h +l f N ( )- h [ ] .
Fundamentally, l is the economic value of a (marginal) unit of the natural
resource stock, variously referred to in the literature as a Keynesian user cost; a
shadow price for those growing up in the planning and programming era of
economics; an accounting price for some, and a rental rate for others.
Important necessary conditions are 11
                                                
11  Clark (1990) Simplicity is not always achieved costlessly. Notice the lack of economic
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where h* is the steady state value and
 (7.2)   )) ( ) ( ( N f h N c
N
H
p ¢ + ¢ - - =
¶
¶ -
= - l l l & ,
where   dt
dl l = & . Consider first, the steady state, when  l & & = =0 N  so harvest (h)
equals natural growth [f(N)] because the natural resource no longer is growing
(from (3)).
To start at bedrock, suppose harvest cost does not depend on the stock
level.
12 Harvesters know the extent of the population with certainty and optimal
technology is fixed. When there are no stock externalities,  ¢  c  ( N ) = 0 , and N = 0, the
marginal product of effort is always a constant. In equilibrium, from (7.2), (7.1)
and (3) respectively,
(8.1) r = ¢  f  N ( )
(8.2) ˆ  P = l
where  ˆ  P  is price net of the wage rate or unit cost of effort, and
(8.3) h = f(N).
Equation (8.1) is reassuring, for it says that in a steady state equilibrium
the own rate of return on natural resource capital  ( ¢  f  ( N ))  ought to equal the
                                                
12  This could occur if we imagine that natural selection, predator-prey interaction and the
characteristics of the natural habitat result in the stock’s density on the fishing ground being
independent of its overall abundance, N. Some schooling species such as salmon, tuna and
clupeids (herring, sardines) are examples.21
discount rate (p). See Figure 2. Having found the optimal population from (8.1),
the steady state harvest (h*) is solved from (8.3) and portrayed in Figure 1. Less
transparent are inferences to be drawn immediately from this model. When there
is an unanticipated price increase, how does this change the optimal stock of
renewable resources? Not at all, because price plays no role in determining the
optimal positive stock of fish capital ((8.1)). There is no change in harvest. If P
increases, the immediate gain is the net price change  d ˆ  P  ( ) scaled by harvest (h +
dh) but the loss is the forgone productivity in perpetuity measured by  dl  scaled
by  h + dh and   d ˆ  P  = dl  from (8.2).
Having learned this lesson for “fish,” the conclusion is the same for any
other renewable resource under like circumstances. If the government subsidizes
the price of crops produced on land or tampers with the export price, does it cause
the quality of soil to deteriorate? The general proposition is this: when the
objective function such as maximizing profit or social welfare is independent of
the resource stock, the unanticipated price change has no effect on the optimal
steady state amount of renewable natural resource stocks. A corollary of this
proposition: monopoly is not necessarily bad from and efficiency perspective. The
optimal steady state renewable resource stock is independent of market
structure—when instantaneous revenues or costs depend only on the harvest
level(s).
13
                                                
13  A monopolist acquiring a non-steady state level of a renewable resource will not always
follow the identical transition path to the steady state as a manager pursuing a social optimum
does if there are positive harvest costs. This proposition remains to be proved. Suggestively, when22
Under these extremely simplifying assumptions we make the reassuring
discovery that managing a renewable resource “merely” involves solving the
basic problem in capital theory. Much was written before this discovery in the
fisheries economics literature. [Crutchfield and Zellner (1966), Quirk and Smith
(1970), Brown 1974].
Three final points are gleaned from the simple model. First, as a point of
reference, note from Figure 2 that the economic optimum resource stock,  N* is
smaller than the resource level which yields the maximum sustainable annual
yield (MSY), a goal long promulgated by fishing biologists and foresters. Second,
as a prelude to later discussion, it is not informative to be in favor of a sustainable
equilibrium.  There are an infinite number of sustainable equilibria stock and
harvest levels, one for every positive level of N. The much harder challenge in
real life is to find the level which rightfully balances the tradeoffs between
efficiency, equity, ecosystem concerns and any other considerations which
sustainability enthusiasts or the analyst believes should govern the solution. Third,
at the primitive level of this model, we can anticipate where the tension arises
between economists and others. For any discount rate above the population’s
biological intrinsic rate of growth (r), the renewable resource is a relatively poor
investment. It should be harvested to extinction and the profits consumed or
invested in opportunities with a higher rate of return. [Clark, (1973), Olson and
                                                                                                                                    
moving toward a steady state from too large an initial population, the monopoly harvester will be
earning negative marginal net revenue at harvest rates earning consumers’ surplus for the
benevolent planner.23
Roy, (1996) and Smith, (1969)]. Optimal extinction is a theoretical possibility;
however, I am unaware of any documented empirical examples although
extinction from no management has occurred. Parenthetically, under putatively
maximum sustained yield management, many fishery stocks have been seriously
depleted and in the United States, some are on the list of endangered species. The
possibility of extinction diminishes substantially when stock effects are
introduced. As the population falls, the cost of search rises and gives the stock a
chance of surviving.
A. Stock Externalities
Return now to the slightly more general case with a stock externality,
where the unit cost of harvest, c(N), gets cheaper the greater is the population. In
this case, the marginal profit rate (P-c(N)) is increasing in the population (Figure
3). By assumption, the resource is more productive marginally, so the new
equilibrium level of resource capital, solving (7.2 using (13) and (7.1) to obtain
p =
- ¢  C  ( N ) f ( N )
P - C ( N )
+ ¢  f  ( N ),  must be greater than before. For maximum pedagogic
effect, the new optimal resource capital  N**, is illustrated to exceed the
biologists’ favorite XMSY in Figure 1 and 4. (Figure 4 is the sum of Figures 1 and 2.
This just goes to show that economists can be the friend of conservationists. The
optimal harvest level is lower than before but of course this will not always be the
case. The favorable stock externality, shifts the optimal stock (N**) to the right of
the simple capital theory solution  (N*), the distance depending on the relative
strength of the externality. Notice that in this new illustrated equilibrium, the24
traditional “own rate of return”  ( ¢  f  ( N ))  on natural resource capital, is negative,
because the stock externality is a further source of marginal product for capital.
Stock externalities, common fare in the resource literature, complicate intuiting
policy implications and other comparative static results because most neoclassical
models explicitly require a positive marginal product of capital,  ¢  f  ( N ) < 0. For
example, it will not be immediately obvious to everyone how an increase in
demand affects steady state harvest and population when there are stock
externalities. [Berck, 1981].
Our intuition is better at sorting out the qualitative aspects of the transition
path. When the resource is short of its steady state, the marginal product of
resource capital is high; i.e., the opportunity cost (l) of harvesting a unit of the
resource therefore is high. If the stocks are to build up, harvest must be restricted.
As the stocks build up, the opportunity cost of harvest falls to its steady state
value. Similarly, the marginal product of a resource is low when discovering a
profitable hitherto unexploited population. Transitory harvest exceeds the steady
state level while the rental rate rises to its steady state value. Only mild conditions
are necessary to insure a unique path to a stationary equilibrium.
I have been a little vague about the exact transition path because there are
two basic stories. The model set forth with a constant price, with or without a
positive stock externality, is distinctive (and not empirically unreasonable for
renewable resources) because it lacks diminishing returns to discipline its pace.
The maximand is linear in the control because unit profit is constant since price25
and unit costs are constant, thus creating a “bang-bang” character to its solution.
When stocks are too low, the rule is don’t harvest anything until the steady state is
achieved because more is gained by waiting. It rarely pays to reduce capital
through harvest of an asset earning more than the market rate of interest.
Similarly, investments earning below rates of return need to be removed (by
harvest) from the portfolio.
14 When the rate of harvest affects price, or when there
are diminishing returns to effort, the pulse harvest phenomenon is removed by a
falling rate of profit as harvest increases.
The basic model has many variants. The economic value of non-
consumptive use may be substantial for many renewable resources. We value
knowing that many species exist and would be willing to pay to preserve their
existence for future generations to enjoy [Krutilla (1967b) and Ciriacy-Wantrup
(1968)]. Probability of survival of a species generally increases with the
population. Such a positive stock externality enters as an argument in the benefit
function and reduces the economic argument for extinction. On the other hand, a
negative stock externality is created when elephants and other charismatic
megafauna terrorize and routinely kill agriculturists.
I have analyzed the determination of the optimal stock and harvest of a
renewable resource using the fishery but the economic substance remains
essentially unchanged except for detail, if a fishery is replaced by other single
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the most rapid approach path (MRAP) in which harvest either is at its minimum or maximum
possible value during the transition period.26
resources: groundwater [Burt (1964, 1967)]; megafauna [Skonhoft and Solstad
(1996); Schulz and Skonhoft (1996)] waterfowl, [Hammack and Brown (1974)],
soils, [McConnell (1983), Barrett (1991), Krautkraemer (1994)] and antibiotics
[Brown and Layton (1996)]. The basic models of soil and groundwater share a
distinguishing common feature worthy of comment. The first model in this
section featured a growth rate varying with the stock of capital. Then a stock
externality was introduced. The stylized models of soil and groundwater and
surface water treat annual natural accretions of rainfall directly or indirectly as
independent of the stock of resource capital so only the negative (increasing cost)
stock externality is present. Some models introduce the offsite consequences of
soil erosion which can be large in some cases, small in others [see McConnell
(1983); Carlson, et al. (1993)]. The analogy in fisheries is a predator-prey model.
B. Optimal Duration of Investment
Thus far the appropriate unit for studying renewable resources is the
population. However, in the case of forestry, the tree is regarded as the relevant
unit for study. It is as if there is no density dependence in the biological growth
equation. Time works as well on one tree as on a large stock [Haavelmo (1960)]
so the key question is when to cut the tree. The answer should not be relegated to
a footnote because the answer is subtle enough so that Irving Fisher (1930), “the
greatest single economic writer on interest and capital,” according to Samuelson
(1976), Hotelling (1925), von Thunen (1826) and Boulding (1935) obtained a
“false solution.”27
Suppose the volume of growing timber at time t is f(t).15 When harvested,
marginal revenue is  P ¢  f  ( t)  because a unit of volume (stumpage price) is worth P if
the volume or quality is too insignificant to influence price. When there is no
opportunity cost of holding land one more period, the forester chooses between
cutting today and earning a one period return of rPf(t) or not cutting today and
earning the one period value of growth, Pf’(t) at interest rate r.  The optimal
rotation time (t*) is the implicit solution to
(9) ¢  f  t * ( ) = rf t * ( ).
Once again price plays no role in the optimal decision to harvest timber. Put in a
policy context, the owner of a property right to cut growing timber exercises the
(certain) right to cut independent of the price of the timber.
When there are repeatedly many harvests, the present value of all rotations
is
(10) V ( t) =
Pf ( t)
e rt - 1
and the best rotation for each and every rotation is given by
(11.1) ¢  f  (t * ) =
r f (t * ) [ ]
1 - e -rt* ,
the Faustmann equation, solved in 1849 [Hyde (1980), Gaffney (1960)]. To
capture economic context visually, rewrite (11.1) as
(11.2) P ¢  f  ( t* ) = rPf ( t* ) +
rPf ( t* )
e
rt * - 1
.
                                                
15  Omitted from analysis is the optimal harvest of old growth forests because this is best
treated as a non-renewable resource. See  Berck (1979) and Johnson and Libecap (1980) for
excellent studies of rational harvest of old growth in the United States.28
When timber is the only source of economic value on land, the optimal time to cut
is a balance between the value of real growth this period, on the l.h.s. of (11.2),
and the one period return on the revenue obtained by cutting now [rPf(t*)] plus
the one period return on the subsequent perpetual stream of optimal tree rotations
on the land. The last set of terms in (11.2), naturally enough, is the interest on
what the land owner can sell the land for after it has been harvested, 
Pf ( t* )
e
rt * - 1
, the
term computed in (10).16
Once again, an unanticipated price change has no effect on the decision to
cut qualitatively in this model unless there is a harvest and replanting cost (w) and
then not much effect if harvest and replanting costs are a small share of total
value.
17 When these costs are present, an unanticipated price increase reduces the
real cost of rotation and w/P decreases. As with any other factor price change, a
decrease occasions increased demand for the factor, meaning more rotations—a
decreased rotation time in this instance.
18
                                                
16  The Faustmann solution is also expressed by the Bellman equation PV(t) = Pf(t) + e
-r
PV(t+1), where PV is present value.
17  Subtract the harvest and replanting cost, w, from revenue in (10) and obtain a new first-
order condition
(11.1
1) ¢  f  (t * ) = r
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rt * . Empirical studies have to allow for anticipated price
changes which have the same comparative statics results as the discount rate does. See  Berck
(1979). When harvest costs vary with the age of tree and with the rate of harvesting and when
there is an initial age distribution of trees, Heaps (1984) argues persuasively that the optimal forest
age distribution approaches a uniform age distribution harvested according to the Faustmann
equation.
18  Other comparative statics are worked out by Hartwick and Olewiler (1998) and
Johansson and Löfgren (1985).29
The consequences of an optimal rotation time for two types of stock
externalities are instructive. The first illustrates the commonality between trees
and fish; the second addresses a popular policy issue. The rotation time is
decreased if the cost of harvesting a cubic meter  falls as trees grow older and
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￿  from a hectare decreases or increases as a
result and whether the supply curve of timber slopes down or up, depends on
whether the optimal economic harvest time is to the left of the age when average
yield is at its maximum. Harvesting at maximum average yield is the traditional
optimal solution for foresters who want to maximize the cumulative mean annual
increment (CMAI) or the largest total volume of timber harvested in perpetuity at
a zero discount rate. Once again, for size economies of harvest large enough, the
optimal economic solution is more conservative, than the biologists’ harvest rule.
Second, there are non-consumptive values related to the forest. There is at
least anecdotal evidence that recreationists prefer to hike in old-growth stands
[Brown and Plummer (1981)] and this extends the optimal rotation time, perhaps
indefinitely, when there is only one rotation [Hartman (1976)]. However, the
multiple rotation setting is more subtle. The opportunity cost of forgoing harvest
is the perpetual delay in enjoyment of hiking in or viewing subsequent forests
slightly younger because of the delayed harvest. In the multiple rotation setting,
harvest should be delayed as long as the non-consumptive values grow with time
[Brown (1996)]. Not surprisingly, the optimal rotation time is not easily described30
when the quality of neighboring forests (rotation time) is a substitute for non-use
in the forest in question [Swallow and Wear (1993)].
C. Renewable Resources in Growth Models
Renewable resources have played a limited role in growth models of the
economy. This could be the result of oversight or the conclusion emerging from
benefit-cost analysis: the insights obtained are not worth the cost. Introducing one
more differential equation to account for renewable resource dynamics makes it
difficult to get general analytical solutions and much of the profession continues
to find it tasteless to rely on computer-aided answers. What fundamental
conclusions  would be changed by introducing renewable resources? Turning
away from speculation about reasons for omission toward description, there
follows some illustrative ways renewables appear in macroeconomic-type models.
(1) Maybe renewable resources play a vital role in explaining why
primitive cultures have experienced cycles of feast and famine and why
agriculture replaces hunter and gathering cultures.  Climatalogical factors are
believed by many to account for the loss of many species of megafauna in the late
Pleistocene era. Vernon Smith (1975) has an alternative explanation. The
Pleistocene overkill theory, Smith argues, is better than the climate change theory
in accounting for the demise of the megafauna after the arrival of man, after
surviving many previous glacial-interglacial cycles. About 11,100 years ago,
Paleolithic migrants crossed the Bering land bridge and found mastodon, camel,
mammoth bison and at least twenty-seven other large herding animals. Imagine31
individual utility maximization using one’s labor to harvest either the open access
resource or corn. These large animals have been poorly selected for a rapacious
human environment, endowed as they were with a herding instinct which stacks
the cards for the hunter. Search costs don’t increase as population decreases for
herding animals. Extinction is guaranteed if the megafauna exhibit depensatory
behavior (stocks decreasing continuously when stocks go below a critical
minimum (N) and hunting is still profitable. See Figure 1b) [Berck, 1979]. Thus
the megafauna are drawn down over time to extinction and labor is reallocated to
corn, the substitute source of utility. Since the marginal utility of meat or animals
is constant or bounded from above in this story, there is a low enough rate of time
preference for it to be socially optimal to destroy the animals. Therefore the open
access condition is not necessary to obtain this model’s conclusion of extinction.
It further could be argued that in the view of low intrinsic rates of growth, open
access was the optimal property rights system. Private property rights system is
adopted only when it pays to do so [Demsetz (1964)].
(2) Brander and Taylor (1998) spin out a story using renewable
resource dynamics to explain feast and famine of the Mayan civilization. The
account is rich in cultural crenulations to support and corroborate the formal
analysis. How was there sufficient leisure time to build and transport a remarkable
number of enormous statues (up to 270 tons each) as they did one-half
millennium or more ago? Population obeys Malthusian rules in their model,32
growing in proportion to per capita consumption.19 The population consumes an
open access harvested renewable resource or an alternative good produced in
proportion to the labor allocated to it. The renewable resource is harvested with a
stock externality. With a large supply of renewable resources, it takes few
workers to harvest to satiation, leaving plenty of time for leisure or to build the
wondrous statues. High per capita consumption stimulates population growth
rates. With a slow growing resource, the system cycles (many people, few “fish;”
few people, many “fish”) to a (unique) steady state.  With a faster growing
resource, the system’s trajectory toward equilibrium is more direct because a high
intrinsic rate of growth more quickly forgives error created by the open access
feature.
(3) Do policies for improving the environment drag down economic
growth? Pollution is mitigated by real resources which have an opportunity cost.
More environmentally benign technologies would have been adopted if they were
least cost.  Bovemberg and  Smulders (1996) work out the compatibility of
environmental improvement and economic growth when the renewable resource,
environment quality, has a utility value. Further, the resource enters the
production directly by enhancing productivity and indirectly through pollution.
IV. Regulating Renewable Resource Use
                                                
19  The Brander and Taylor model has the same structure as V. Smith’s fishing model, when
population growth replaces the dynamics of entry into the fishery, a point Wilen made in personal
communication.33
There is an evolutionary pattern of resource management policy, As
resource stocks are drawn down, management agencies dominated by non-
economists, restricted overall harvest thereby reducing the domain of common
property to the harvestable quota. No particular economic purpose is served by
this policy but it could achieve biological goals if the agencies were resolute and
immune from the pressures for greater quotas exerted by harvesters concerned
about meeting mortgages on boats, for example.
Economists first recommended restricting inputs to combat open access
but this merely slowed the process of waste as the harvesters exploited the
unconstrained inputs. [ Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969]. Economists then
recommended  charges which found no receptive audience outside the
profession.20 The most recent innovation is individual transferable quotas (ITQs),
a policy which creates property rights.  ITQs are now growing in use or
recommended for use in fisheries around the world and for managing
groundwater, water and air quality (including global warming). Existing
harvesters obviously are more likely to rank ITQs above charges if the quotas are
not auctioned off in a competitive market. There are even ITQs for wood stoves in
Telluride, Colorado, introduced to control the major source of air pollution. The
idea of an ITQ system arguably gets a gold star for economists. I turn now to a
more careful treatment of management policies. Most of the literature on
regulating renewable resources has focused on fisheries. The treatment here34
reflects this concentration, with caveats and addendums to encompass other
renewables, when appropriate.
The management problem in Section III was framed as the maximization
of social benefits constrained by the population dynamics of the resource. One
candidate management tool is self-evident from the solution to this problem.
Establish a price policy and charge every harvester a unit price  ( l )  or rental rate
which reflects the social component of the opportunity cost of harvest.21
Since the basic model is so linear, by construction, the benevolent dictator
has also to fix the amount of harvest per firm, a fact usually unrecognized in the
literature. Of course an equivalent solution requiring the same information is
merely to fix the harvest for each firm. Price is unnecessary in this model unless
the dictator has a particular preference for a price policy or has inexplicit
distributive goals achieved by a charge system. Probably a dynamic version of
Weitzman’s “Prices vs. Quantities” (1974b) could support a quota policy.
In the  real world, the single charge does not remove all economic
inefficiencies likely to arise. Some rushing incentives exist when the unit cost of
harvest increases within a season. Harvesters may have an incentive to harvest in
a spatially uneconomical manner as they attempt to intercept migratory species
                                                                                                                                    
20 One important exception is the promulgation of the polluter-pay principle by the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (1977).
21 The net cast by this model is too porous to capture optimal weight and size of fish but the
prescription follows by analogy. For every physical distinction in the model there is an economic
(charge) equivalent. See Clark [1990] on growth and aging. The early economic literature (Turvey,
1964, Crutchfield, 1959] verbally discussed policies such as optimal mesh size which addresses
size issues. If frequency of appearance is a guide, formal age structure models have not been
judged by economists to be useful enough to compensate for the increased difficulty.35
before their competitors do. These and other complications are candidates for
inclusion in applied models. The cost of more complex transactions disciplines
the optimal amount of time and space variations in the price policy or other policy
instruments.
The charge component capturing the non-private opportunity cost for
groundwater extraction differs enough in calculation to warrant mention, in order
to emphasize the economic distinction. Suppose an underground reservoir where
the hydrology usually is modeled as an annual fixed quantity of water flowing
into the reservoir. Therefore, use today does not affect the growth rate
( ¢  f  ( N ) = o, "N ) . The social cost component arises because a pumper withdrawing a
unit of water from the ground makes the depth to groundwater for everyone in the
basin a bit deeper, ceteris paribus. 22 The charge captures the present value of the
future added pumping costs, not incident on a private pumper [Burt (1964),
Brown and McGuire (1967)], but on the other pumpers. 23 The charge captures
                                                
22 Suppose a unit of water (z) produces a unit of product which sells for P and total cost,
c(m,z) depends on depth to water (m) and amount pumped. Thus  , / z A m dt dm - = =
￿
, where
A is the constant periodic natural recharge. Then the current value Hamiltonian (again with  r  the
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So that in steady state, the social cost component is,  l = c m r, the present value of all the
increased pumping costs arising from pumping a bit more groundwater today.
23  The way to drive the pumping tax effectively to zero is to arbitrarily assume that pumps36
only the technological stock externality because the resource is not growing
whereas the harvesters in the first fish model should see only the perpetual loss to
fish productivity when making private decisions since there is no stock
externality.24 I know of no pump charge purposely used to reflect the
technological externality and to achieve economic efficiency in groundwater
management.
In Section III, the industry production function for a fishery is
h = EN
so the marginal and average product of effort  (E) are the same. With a more
general industry production function,
(1¢) h = y( E , N ),
the marginal and average product of effort can diverge. When this occurs there is
then a boat externality [Brown (1974), Smith (1968), Quirk and Smith (1970)].
Potential harvesters enter if average product exceeds price. All harvesters are
alike in (1) so the harvest of each must be identical.25 When ( ¢  1  ) holds, the
potential entrant must see the consequences of entry on all others. Either the
central authority fixes the amount of effort at its optimal amount or for those
                                                                                                                                    
cost the same whether the depth to water is 100 or 3000 feet, and to make the technical externality
among pumpers de minimis, as Gisser did [Gisser, (1983)]. Then groundwater is a private good.
24  The public cost of soil erosion depends on the natural off-site damages (or benefits) such
as reduced storage capacity and destruction of salmon rearing habitats in streams.
25  It is one thing to specify a constant marginal productivity of effort in a fishery (see (1)),
in which case rents are dissipated under common property regime. To then say this is true about
the real world, as many do, is to disregard heterogeneity which creates rents whose recipients
might lose under a different management scheme. Omitting this source of opposition to change
makes it harder to understand why otherwise rational policies are not adopted. For a proof that the
variable factor of production is always better off with free access when its supply function has a37
enamored with decentralization there is a boat tax  t ( ) which corrects the
discrepancy between the marginal (MPE) and average product (APE) of effort,
t + MP E = AP E .
Of models resembling those discussed, Coase (1970) remarked: “These studies of
what heaven is like are not without interest, but they are bound to have most
interest for people who are sure of getting there.” If a charge exists in the real
world, it is unlikely that it is motivated by economic efficiency. In contrast, rights
to harvest federal forests in the United States are auctioned off to those willing to
pay the highest stumpage fee. Why harvesters must bid by auction for the right to
cut timber on public lands in the U.S. and elsewhere but the right to harvest fish
from public waters generally is free remains an open question.
Policies which constrain individual harvest behavior typically begin when
there has been serious over-fishing and a majority of the harvesters are earning
low income, a politically inauspicious moment to further burden many small
fishing enterprises with a charge. By contrast companies listed on the major stock
exchanges harvest a large fraction of the timber on public lands. Firm size and
economic circumstance might help explain the policy difference between two
major renewable resources.
A. Restricting Entry—An Important Historical Digression
Renewable resources usually remain in a natural state of open access as
long as scarcity is not an important consideration. One prevailing view in the later
                                                                                                                                    
positive slope, see Weitzman (1974a).38
19th century was that fishery resources were inexhaustible so there was no need
for regulation.26
When Gordon (1954), Scott (1955) and Crutchfield (1956) discovered that
the root problem in the fishery was open access and many stocks were in serious
decline, it is understandable that their solution was to recommend restricted
access. By legally fixing the number of vessels permitted to have access to fishing
a given species, resources would be saved, as much as three-fourths of the
prevailing harvest cost in the case of Alaska salmon [Crutchfield and Pontecorvo
(1969)]. Fishery biologists running the fishery management agencies had been
setting fishery-wide quotas to protect stocks, closing the season when the
specified quota was obtained. Limited entry predictably resulted in reductions in
season length as time passed. The season for harvesting halibut in the U.S. has
fallen from six months to 26 days and then to 48 hours in a recent year.
The effectiveness of restricting entry varies with the inflexibility of
substitution possibilities in the harvest production function. Unless regulators are
willing and able to control each element in the vector of inputs, harvesters will
waste resources in an attempt to maximize individual shares of the industry quota.
When regulators fix the number of boats, owners increase the size of boats. When
regulators respond and fix the length of boats, profit maximizers make rounder
boats and invest in large engines to get to and from the grounds quickly. Boats
                                                
26 “The cod fishery, the herring fishery, the pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and
probably all the great sea fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say that nothing we do seriously
affects the number of fish. And any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems consequently, from39
fishing in areas with different length restrictions have auxiliary bows which can
be put on or taken off. Ample opportunities for capital stuffing, in fact, are
substantiated in the fishery literature. Some halibut fishermen, facing an expected
two-day season, installed three identical electronic systems, one necessary, two
others for insurance against malfunction.
A change in focal point from controlling inputs to the recognition that fish are
capital, that the missing market for the resource’s in situ must be addressed, and
that a price per unit of harvest was an appropriate conceptual tool, did not occur
until formal intertemporal optimizing models were constructed and the adjoint
variable or rental rate appeared explicitly on the written page. Quirk and Smith
(1970) may have been the first to recommend an optimal unit charge.27 Is this a
case where the complexities of intertemporal dynamics hid from view the
conceptually correct ideas; that we had to wait for modern formal treatment using
control theory, for example, to get headed in the right direction? Until its
application to the fishery there is no recognition that fish  are capital, a useful
beacon for thinking about natural resources. This, in turn makes it clear that the
discount rate can play an important role in determining the optimal stock. The
larger the effective discount rate, as for example in developing economies, the
larger will be the error from implicitly assuming a zero discount rate, the practice
of earlier researchers. However the practical consequence may, in fact be small.
                                                                                                                                    
the nature of the case, to be useless.” J.H. Huxley (1881) quoted in Graham (1943), in turn quoted
by Gordon (1954).40
B. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
Another policy tool is the creation of private property rights by the state
and their distribution to harvesters. I have in mind a right to harvest a specified
quantity (and quality) of the resource for a specified duration. An annual version
is the rental market for irrigation water in Colorado. In recognition of uncertainty,
the allowable individual harvest per season will vary so that the right may be
specified in terms of fraction of total harvest. It took some time for individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) for the fishery to become coin of the realm. ITQs are
one of the most important practical ideas the renewable resource literature has
contributed to the profession. While the value of an ITQ merely is the asset
equivalent of the unit price or rental rate, price is demonstrably not politically
feasible whereas an ITQ increasingly is politically feasible and encourages
economic efficiency. Crocker (1966) may have been the first economist to
recommend the use of a property rights system to manage environmental
pollution, followed soon after by Dales (1968) whose book received more
notoriety.28  A concrete realization of such proposals is the Sulfur Dioxide
Emission trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
The idea of ITQs was slow to develop in the fisheries in North America.
Scott (1979) argued for ITQs in a keystone paper on regulation more than a
                                                                                                                                    
27 Perhaps the first treatment of the intertemporal renewable resource problem with density
dependence is found in the Appendix of Crutchfield and Zellner (1966), but there is no discussion
of policy in that Appendix.
28 For a contrast in policy recommendations to handle open access problems, see Kneese
and Bower (1968). Only in retrospect, is it easy to recognize that when property is the source of
misuse, private property (ITQs) is a solution.41
decade after Crocker’s paper and there was diffident mention of ITQs by Christy
(1973) a few years earlier. All of the discussions tying ITQs to fisheries were in
obscure publications. Perhaps that is an object lesson in itself. Nevertheless, it is a
bit worrisome that the transfer of important ideas from one part of natural
resource economics to another in this instance took place with lags of a decade or
more.
ITQs are proliferating throughout the fisheries of the world. No fishery has
abandoned an ITQ policy once implemented. The ITQ fisheries in New Zealand
have an estimated present value of about 2 billion dollars according to Ronald
Johnson (personal communication). The argument that the value of a fishery
would increase because of cost savings due to ITQs was ubiquitous in the
economics literature. Conversely, one searches in vain to find any discussion
about product price increases that can be anticipated from introducing ITQs. Yet
substantial product price increases exceeding 50 percent have been observed in
many fisheries as a result of rationalizing the rate of harvest as well as improving
quality (Wilen and Casey, 1997). Arnason (1996) has summarized the value of
alternative management regimes, making appropriate caveats for the perils of
making  cross country comparisons. Table 1 indicates how valuable private
property rights in fisheries are, starting from an initial open access with zero
rights not long ago.
[Insert Table 1 here]42
In contrast to fisheries, there are very few groundwater basins in the U.S.
in which the rights have been adjudicated. Perhaps this is because monitoring the
extraction rate is difficult but this depends on the precision of the relationship
between water extracted and energy use. Other reasons for the failure to assign
individual rights to groundwater include the substantial legal costs and uncertainty
of outcome. Adjudication will result in immediate loss because current
overpumping will have to stop. In return there is uncertainty about the future
lower adjudicated quantity and its long run value.
The rule for allocating initial ITQs is the crux issue and may be a
stumbling block to adoption. Usually the allocation is based on some measure of
historic catch (or historic groundwater extraction) but in one case investment
levels was a criterion [Anderson (1992)] and there is at least one case of
acquisition by auction.  Adoption of an ITQ system also can be stymied by
processors who can lose with the introduction of an ITQ system. No longer is
there a race to harvest a fishery-wide quota. Harvest rates  fall which creates
excess processing capacity and excess demand for fish by processors. During the
transition, Matulich et al. (1996) argue, in a perfectly competitive framework,29
processors earn below normal rates of return and ITQ holders capture these quasi-
rents. The magnitude and duration of the losses to the processor depends on the
non-malleability of capital owned by processors.  Lindner et al. (1992) provide
                                                
29  See also Kochin and Riley (1994). Policies to remedy non-competitive processors are
worked out by Clark and Munro (1980) and Munro (1982).43
empirical evidence from New Zealand fisheries which supports the theoretical
argument.
Advocates of ITQs for fisheries or for any other renewable resource have
yet to argue for complete private determination of the annual fishery quota.
However economists will nod knowingly when they learn that a very substantial
share of research in the ITQ fisheries now is paid for by the ITQ owners and is
privately supplied under competitive bidding in British Columbia and New
Zealand. Such is the power of private property rights that the character and scale
of fishery agencies has changed in these cases.
ITQs are not a panacea. In the absence of careful monitoring, harvesters
will be encouraged to “high grade” causing social loss if some fish of the same
species sell for a higher price and the quota is defined on the species. ITQs don’t
solve the by-catch problem - substantial harvest of species which are then
discarded - and can make it worse, in reality, in the absence of rental markets for
ITQs for the species in question. We also know that the determination of annual
harvest by ITQ owners won’t achieve efficiency if fish populations don’t respect
the political boundaries of the entity giving out rights. An optimum single species
solution is unlikely to be a social optimum if there are predator-prey
interactions—fish eat—and other ecosystems interdependencies, unless there are
ITQs for all relevant elements of the ecosystem. Public good aspects such as
whale watching and perceived discrepancies between the social and private rate of
discount are among the  considerations which are likely to limit unbounded44
enthusiasm for complete devolution of stock determination to the private sector.
Each of these concerns can be finessed in a model with enough dimensions
combined with facilitating assumptions such as innocuous transaction costs.
However, Scott (1979) warns that “we must continue...to remain suspended
between the pure theory of a single fish stock and the rag bag of technical,
administrating and political difficulties that confront actual fisheries management
agencies.”
C. Managing Global Commons
Ozone depletion, global warming, transboundary fisheries and pollution
are significant policy  issues which are attracting increasing public and
professional attention. Common features of each problem are players from few or
many countries who cause asymmetric future costs to themselves and others by
actions which deplete the resource stock. International externalities are made
more difficult to solve because there is no central jurisdictional authority to
enforce management arrangements for the global commons among the affected
players.30  Barrett (1990, 1995) credits Charlemagne with reaching the first
international agreement regarding natural resources in 805 when he granted rights
of navigation to a monastery and cites more than 100 international environmental
agreements joining up to 161 countries regulating transboundary resources.31
                                                
30  On the other hand, when international organizations do form, as exemplified by The
International Pacific halibut Commission, they are less likely to be captured, to which fishery
management councils in the U.S. are vulnerable. See Devar (1983). (Personal communication
from Peter Berck.
31  Perhaps the first modern economic analysis of international cooperation for renewable
(but not global) resource management is Krutilla’s study (1967a) of the Columbia River treaty45
The migratory behavior of fish is an obvious source of conflict among
nations. With the passage of time, the area of the ocean falling under the
jurisdiction of coastal nations has extended out to 200 miles. At least 90 percent
of the world’s fishing resources have been thought to reside within the 200-mile
boundary according to Kaitala and Munro (1993). However, because of their
mobility and extensiveness, substantial fisheries off the coasts of North and South
America, western and central Pacific and off Africa are shared (Munro, 1986).
Changing the jurisdictional boundaries merely varied the parties in conflict. The
Grand Banks off the coast of Canada and the United States is one of the richest
fishing grounds in the world and is, in part, a high seas fishing exploited by the
European Community. A rich groundfish fishery in the North Pacific is shared by
the United States and Russia as well as a high seas portion in which over
exploitation has caused harvest to fall from 1.6 million tons in 1988 to 22,000
tons by 1992 (Kaitala and Munro, 1993). It is not surprising then that early on fish
were the subject of a simple Nash co-operative bargaining game between two
countries. (Munro, 1979).
Barrett (1990), Mäler (1989) and Hoel (1991a) were among the first to
formulate models in which externalities believed to be creating depletion and
global warming are reciprocal but not symmetric. Moreover, the nature, timing,
distribution and certainty of benefits and costs vary among the problems. We
therefore expect that the terms of reference and ease of reaching international
                                                                                                                                    
between the U.S. and Canada. The optimal sequence of investment projects was included in the46
agreements among nations can be quite different across policy issues. These
authors offer some stylized facts in support of their models.
Turning to specifics, the core problem is created when each country
benefits by depleting an open access resource. However, the cost of fish depletion
incident on all harvesters is more immediate than the possible cost of global
warming which is uncertain and may not occur for many decades. Generally
speaking, no country can take the word of every other country (credible
commitments) as immutable fact. Thus each country is forced to find a policy rule
which is best for a specified level of the renewable resource. The equilibrium
behavior of two or more parties harvesting a common property naturally depends
on the setting. An exceptionally clear paper by Levhari and Mirman (1980) is a
useful starting point. A common fish stock is harvested by two countries but
extending the problem to many countries is straightforward.
By a suitable choice of objective functions for each country, one that
excludes the fish stock, and an innovative specification of the population
dynamics, Levhari and Mirman (1980) derive a closed form Markov-Nash
equilibrium in which the policy function is linear in the population, for non-
cooperative, cooperative and Stackleberg games. Since open access is just the
non-cooperative game with infinitely many players, the cooperative steady state
solution with two players at the other end of the spectrum is evident. Cooperation
results in a larger equilibrium resource capital stock when there is a common
                                                                                                                                    
analysis.47
discount rate. When there is a leading country, it exploits its power with greater
short run harvest and a lower steady state population.
In infinitely repeated game settings, it is well known that an efficient
cooperative strategy can be supported as an equilibrium, by threat of credible
punishment, provided the discount rate is low enough. If anyone deviates from a
cooperative strategy, the game reverts to the Cournot-Nash one-shot non-
cooperative solution. For a low enough discount rate, the short run gain from
defection is offset by the long run forgone gains from cooperation.
Unfortunately, most natural resource harvesting in real life does not have
the structure of a repeated game. The payoffs to players in natural resource
settings typically depend on the size of a state variable: the relevant resource
stock. For example, the unit cost of fish harvest of groundwater extraction
depends on the size or level of the resource stock, and the stock level changes
from period to period. The benefit functions may also depend on the level of the
resource stock, as in the case of whale watching. Consequently, the mapping of
strategies to payoffs changes from period to period. The existence of stock
externalities casts the problem into the context of “dynamic games” in general,
and not the special case of repeated games in particular.
Fishing is not an infinitely repeated game because payoffs are state
variable dependent. Dutta (1995) has demonstrated that the intuition developed
from infinitely repeated games does not necessarily carry over to the more general
category of dynamic games. Reiterating Dutta’s motivating example of this point,48
when the discount rate falls in a neoclassical growth model, consumption is lower
for any given capital stock. If all others decrease consumption, the reward for a
given player to deviate increases. Against this incentive is the increased first-best
payoff with a lower discount rate. Because of this tradeoff, it does not necessarily
follow that the optimal strategy is cooperation for a low enough discount rate. In
repeated games, short run gains do not depend on the discount rate, but the long
run losses from deviation do. Both gains and losses depend on the discount rate in
dynamic games in which payoffs are state variable dependent.
I am unaware of any realistic dynamic game models in the natural
resource common property setting in which an efficient equilibrium is derived and
supported by a self-enforcing punishment strategy. Reasoning from Abreu’s
(1986) work on repeated games, perhaps such equilibrium could be supported by
credible punishment paths that have a stick-and-carrot character.32 Players would
begin by cooperating. Whenever a player deviates, a trigger strategy would
involve a zero profit stage of overfishing, to be immediately followed by a zero
profit stage of absolutely no fishing. This latter stage would allow the resource
stock to recover from the initial overfishing. Players following through with this
punishment scheme would eventually be rewarded with a return to cooperative
behavior. The key for this analysis is the issue of whether such a stick-and-carrot
punishment scheme is credible in the context of a general dynamic game, rather
than the kind of repeated game to which Abreu’s analysis directly applies. So
                                                
32This speculation comes from personal communication with Greg Ellis.49
much for the lineaments of the theory. What about practice?
Harvest of the North Pacific Fur Seal, studied by Wilen (1976) and
Paterson and Wilen (1977) is an empirical illustration of a solution to a
cooperative game after a regime of open access. The fur seal is pelagic, spending
part of its time at sea where it was under open access harvest pressure by the U.S.,
Canada, Russia and Japan. Part of the year the fur seals spend on the Pribilof
Islands where there is controlled harvest by the U.S. Wilen has a compelling
model which describes the cycling of harvest, stocks, and profits under open
access conditions as the vessels and harvest vary by more than an order of
magnitude over about three decades. Accurately observing the precipitous
declines in population on land, imminent extinction prompted a treaty between the
fur harvesting countries which has lasted throughout most of this century. Each
country received equal shares of the pelts from surplus males harvested by the
least cost country. The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty contains a trigger strategy
which terminates the agreement if a country cheats and is unrepentant. Reaching a
cooperative agreement for managing these fur seals doubtlessly was made easier
because the accurate assessment by all of the perilous state of the mammals’
population on the islands at one time, removed this factor from objective debate
or strategic gaming.
In contrast to the cooperative agreement among principle fur seal
harvesting nations when extinction seemed likely, is the case of Minke whaling
[Amundsen, et al. (1995), Conrad and Bjørndal (1993)]. The population fell50
dramatically under open access pressure until an International Whaling
Commission succeeded in stopping harvest. Mounting search costs with falling
stocks made it empirically unlikely that the Minke whale would go extinct.33 The
Minke whale population has recovered to levels which permit harvest but pressure
by environmentalists keeps the “fishery” closed.
The Montreal Protocols, an international agreement to control ozone
depletion in the atmosphere, provides an instructive focal point for thinking about
the continuing debate over the issue of global warming. Ozone is depleted from
the atmosphere by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used for a refrigerant and in
aerosols.  Most of the key countries of the world became signatories to the
Montreal Protocols when it became very certain that the spatial location of ozone
depletion was increasing ultraviolet radiation for large parts of densely populated
regions of the world and this was known to cause skin cancer and eye diseases.
Free riding is discouraged by prohibitions against trade of CFCs between those in
and those out of the agreement during the phasing out period [Field (1997)]. High
cost countries were induced to join by side payments (technology transfer) of
more than 100 million dollars and developing economies were granted later target
dates. Permitted production quotas are transferable to encourage signing,
efficiency and compliance with the terms of the treaty. Agreement was facilitated
because substitute technologies are relatively inexpensive. The Montreal
Protocols illustrate an actual, if not quite ideal solution to a cooperative game, as
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Bohm (1990) makes clear. Barrett (1996) demonstrates that ozone depletion is a
case of high benefits relative to costs, conditions conducive to an international
agreement.
Many economists have predicted that reaching a productive international
agreement for mitigating global warming is likely to be much more difficult as the
results of the recent international conference in Kyoto, Japan attest. The benefits
of reducing carbon emissions in order to reduce global warming are uncertain,
very much in the future, small and negative in some countries,34 whereas the costs
of mitigation are near term and immense [Schelling (1992)], orders of magnitude
more significant than managing CFC and measured in the hundreds of trillions of
dollars. Unlike CFCs, where all countries obtain gross benefits from control, some
countries will benefit from global warming.35 Why should they cooperate?
Relatively poor countries such as China, amply endowed with coal rich in carbon
emissions and possessed with ambitious growth plans, effectively can nullify any
plausible carbon mitigation efforts of the industrialized countries unless
compensated for their costs of adjustment. If transferable carbon emission permits
are entertained, economists would predict a solution to the perceived global
                                                                                                                                    
who argued that open access leads inevitably to extinction.
34  Nordhaus (1994) surveyed experts on global warming, drawing from members of
greenhouse-warming panels of the National Academy of Science and from authors on the
economics of climate change. Natural scientists’ estimates of damages from global warming “were
20 to 30 times higher than mainstream economists.” Such a dramatic discrepancy invites
exploration of the source of these professional differences.
35  The United States may be a net beneficiary of assumed climate change scenario. If
farmers are allowed to find the best crop in response to climate change, it has been estimated that
U.S. agriculture may benefit from global warming [Mendelson, et al. (1994)]. If it is assumed that
farmers cannot substitute out of the preclimate change, crop losses are expected [Cline (1992)].52
warming problem only if emission rights are predominantly distributed to the
relatively poor countries, many of which will then have to be purchased by the
economically advanced countries. The stated position of the U.S. at Kyoto, to
mitigate only if the developing economies also made a binding commitment,
reflects the reasoning of Larry Summers, on loan to the Clinton administration
from Harvard’s economics department and the empirical work and reasoning of
economists such as Nordhaus (1994) and Schelling (1992).
Whereas a relatively simple economic model reflects fairly accurately the
schematics of the Montreal Protocol, the discrepancy is large between Mäler’s
cooperative model for solving the acid rain problem in Europe36 and the actual
1985 Sulfur Emissions Protocol which called for a uniform 30 percent reduction
from a base period of all countries.
For a final comparison between practice and models, Hoel (1991b)
reminds us through demonstration that we should know those with whom we play
games. Imagine that many countries, playing a non-cooperative game in quantities
of abatement, reach a solution. Consider an alternative prospect in which one
country, perhaps motivated by altruism, makes a unilateral commitment to an
ambitious abatement plan (a more responsive reaction function in abatement). It
easily could be rational for the other countries to respond by abating enough less
that the global environment will be worse compared to no pre-commitment.
Illustratively, in the 1970s, prior to the Montreal Protocol, the Scandinavian
                                                
36  Barrett (1990) citing Mäler (1989).53
countries together with the U.S. and Canada banned CFCs in aerosols and no
other country followed for more than a decade.
V. Common Property Resource Management
Gordon’s (1954) analysis of common property resources in the context of
fisheries was popularized by Hardin (1968) writing about the tragedy of the
commons that ensues when many individuals exploit a scarce resource lacking
property rights. Many researchers, among them Ostrom (1990) and Bromley
(1990), successfully have prevailed upon the profession to call this condition open
access. However, in so doing, the potential for confusion is created because it
changes the meaning of common property in mid-stream. In recent years it no
longer means open access. Common property in this section refers to the instances
when there is collective self-management by individuals using natural resources
in common. As such, common property falls between private ownership with
private property rights which can be bought and sold, discussed in the previous
section and central or state regulation. Common property management was
overlooked by those attracted to the extreme solutions: Hardin seems to prefer
command and control management while authors such as Demsetz (1964) have a
pronounced inclination to privatize the commons.
Proper husbandry of a resource requires a set of rules that govern
permissible use, establish obligations, responsibilities and privileges; and by
implication, actions which are forbidden. Procedures for monitoring, enforcing
and sanctions for violations are essential ingredients of an institution that governs54
common property. Common property management refers almost exclusively to
local  self governance. The corpus of the institution varies with circumstances.
Options include a union, a cooperative, or just a part of the day-to-day
administrative functions of a village.
Self governance of open access resources is attractive when it can be
achieved with low costs of information, bargaining, monitoring and enforcement.
Thus far, case studies comprise the basis for much of the research bearing on the
necessary conditions for choosing  self governance and the form it takes. The
analysis does not conform to the conditions of the simple “metaphorical” models
congenial to mainstream economics and the studies have yet to yield substantive
unambiguous principles. However, there are some common ideas in the literature.
Communitarian solutions are numerously found in  small grazing areas,
groundwater basins, irrigation systems, forests and inshore fisheries. They pertain
to renewable not non-renewable natural resource use. Ostrom’s (1990) cases are
situations where the users in toto can impose major penalties at modest expense
but an individual cannot inflict major harm on others. Illustratively, a peasant’s
share of the common grazing land is limited to the number of cattle the farmer can
winter-over in Torbel, Switzerland. Existing owners of private land and water
rights, by law, can exclude any one who cheats, so a peasant faces the loss of a
perpetual right in return for a small gain from cheating since the size of a viable
herd for a given farmer can be closely estimated.55
Substantial resource scarcity exists, a condition corroborated by case
studies that Dasgupta (1996) cites. For example, local commons contributed 15-
25 percent of total income among families in eighty Indian villages (Jodha, 1986).
Common property provides a mechanism for pooling risk among the poorest. This
partially explains why reliance on common property declines with increasing
wealth.
One expects that a common property solution is attractive when the
number of “actors” is small but there are cases where thousands are included
[Ostrom (1990)]. Finally,  self management has appeal when there are shared
norms of behavior and a comparable technology exists among the users. With a
similar technology, dissimilar harvest would be suspicious. In other words,
heterogeneity makes it difficult to agree on a contract and costly to enforce as
Johnson and Libecap (1982) ably demonstrate in the context of fisheries.
Research of this nature contributes to our understanding of the impediments
which mitigate against rationalizing the fishery and other resources by the
introduction of individual quotas discussed elsewhere, particularly when
conventional analysis (neglecting transaction and related costs) points to the large
gains to be made from change.
Self management keeps transactions costs low when conformance is
obtained as a joint product from the cultural and social fabric that often clothes a
small community. Sanctioning violation of the rules of the game by social
opprobrium heaps costs on the miscreant and family. Lawyers, courts, jails and56
probation officers are less essential. Common property advocates are strange
bedfellows; contracterians and strict Coasians join institutionalists who probably
feel more comfortable with anthropologists than with most contemporary
economists.
Common property management is not likely to work in transitional
communities experiencing substantial changes in the size or composition of its
population. Johnson and Libecap (1982) describe the disruption to the U.S. Gulf
inshore shrimp fishery occasioned by the entry of Vietnamese refugees. Both
violence and appeal to legislation were used to limit entry by “outsiders.”
The status of the common property institution is sensitive to technical
progress such as the invention of barbed wire which encouraged privatization of
grazing lands in western United States. Changing transactions costs among
consumers and the costs of excluding outsiders can make common property
“ownership” more or less attractive [Barry Field (1984)]. Product price increases
can make private property more attractive than common, particularly for those in
command such as the elders of the tribe, if they can enhance their wealth without
the increased disparity in the distribution of wealth being too disruptive. In
contrast, product price changes and technical change which effectively make
exclusion more difficult have increased the commons area for lobstering in some
regions of Maine [Acheson (1987)].
Johnson and Libecap (1982) argue  persuasively that unenlightened
government policies can prevent or discriminate against common property like57
resource management arrangements. The Gulf Coast Shrimpers and Oystermen
Association were found in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because they
restricted entry (fishing effort) and fixed relative prices for different aged shrimp
in order to induce shrimpers to harvest at more nearly the economic optimal age
and at lower unit cost.
A well known example of common property management is the lobster
fishery off the coast of Maine [Acheson (1987)]. If one wants to set traps for
harvesting lobsters in a territory around a harbor, it is necessary to become
accepted in a harbor gang, the group of individuals who leave from a specific
harbor for their lobstering activities. Entry into the gang is easier if one comes
from a family with a long fishing tradition and has kinsmen who are gang
members. Some “outsiders” are never accepted. Unauthorized entrants are warned
to leave by discovering the doors of their lobster traps open or by a specific knot
tied around the buoy lying on the surface of the water identifying his/her trap.
Unheeded warnings are followed by increased punishment: cutting the buoy line
resulting in the loss of relatively expensive traps. Enforcement is achieved
without the use of police and it is expensive for the unwanted entrant to obtain
evidence of the cause of loss that will stand up in court. The intensity of
ownership claims diminishes with distance from a harbor—as net earnings
decrease. Although lobsters are relatively sedentary, there is seasonal inshore-
offshore migration. Thus it would be difficult for a harbor gang to design a58
dynamically efficient harvest rate, particularly since the lobster not harvested in
harbor A this season might go to harbor B next season.
Common property advocates don’t make a claim for economic efficiency.
Rather they argue that common property management preserves the resource, and
enhances the rental value of the fishery. One exception is study of communal use
of forest biomass in which Lopez (1997) estimates that communal management
internalizes about 30% of the externality.
VI. Spatial Dimension
How many papers have you read recently in which the spatial dimension
played a prominent role? In his Ohlin Lectures, Krugman (1996) argues that the
nature of spatial economics creates an unfriendly terrain for cultivation by
traditional modeling approaches. For example, increasing returns to scale are
necessary to explain a recognizable geography, whereas constant returns to scale
long has formed the standard foundation. The omission of the spatial component
in the composition of renewable resource models is unfortunate Just as it
makes a world of difference to study renewable resources from an intertemporal
framework, it is natural to imagine, then, that the insights gained by introducing
the spatial dimension could be substantial. We have known about the potential
dangers of omitting the spatial dimension in analysis, for more than thirty years,
since Kneese and Bower (1968) estimated the net gains from spatially
differentiated efficient charges for managing the Delaware Estuary. The concern
by economists always has been to admonish the environmental policy makers59
against the use of standards or charges uniform over space and polluter, yet the
Delaware Estuary study is a rare explicit treatment of space.
A key ingredient in metapopulation models is the spatial element.
Representatives of a given species of insects, plants, mammals and other
organisms live in spatially distinct areas and have spatially differentiated
parameters. An illustration from marine species serves well.  Metapopulation
models describe very valuable coastal marine populations including harvested
stocks such as lobsters, shrimp, mussels and some fish. During the adult phase of
the life cycle there can be many spatially separated populations biologically
connected through a larvae pool in an earlier stage of the life cycle. Each adult
population can be thought of as a firm in terms of producing spatially distinctive
output, but the economic nature of the problem is complicated by the common
pool spatially distinct from larvae sources, into which each local population
contributes and from which each local population obtains larvae which mature to
adults.
In one metapopulation model [Brown and Roughgarden (1997)] the
economic optimum, driven by biological specifications is a little surprising. It is
optimal in this model to harvest all the adults from every local population but the
one which, roughly put, is most efficient at producing larvae.37 How can this be?
The answer was given by Krugman (1996). Staring at the biology hard enough
reveals unbounded increasing returns. Not only are the population dynamics in
                                                
37  A reviewer rightly pointed out that such a policy would reduce genetic diversity, a60
this spatial model substantially different from the standard bioeconomic models
but the policy prescriptions are dramatically different. Harvesting all the adults at
all but one location makes maximum space available and does not cause
extinction because these locations are recolonized by the most productive source.
The institutional fabric, including a suitable property rights structure, designed to
achieve efficient exploitation of a metapopulation, necessarily differs from the
one designed to manage many competitive firms producing for the same market
with no technical interdependence. With the common pool of larvae, its
metaphorical owner “buys” larvae from each local population at a proper price.
There is an optimal and different rate of exchange for each local market and for
the owner of each larvae pool because the parameters of each owner’s production
function differ and perhaps each has a different transport price to market. Thus the
rental rate for the resource is spatially variable as in simple non-renewable
resource models where different quality ones sell for different prices. However,
unlike non-renewables, it is optimal to harvest from many sites at the same time,
even though the in situ value varies across sites.
When the analyst studying a metapopulation fails to study it properly,
there is the prospect of making two types of errors. First the local populations
may be regarded as two unconnected populations. In this case, a population with a
comparative advantage in exporting will be over-harvested while a population
with a comparative advantage in harvesting costs will be under-harvested.
                                                                                                                                    
consequence omitted by the narrow model.61
Alternatively, a metapopulation could be inappropriately modeled and managed
as a homogeneous population [Tuck and Possingham (1994)].38
Unlike the Tuck and Possingham metapopulation model featuring time
and space, Chakravorty, et al. (1995),  study a single period spatial model of
surface water allocation. Suppose, time (t) in the familiar differential equation
describing population dynamics, is replaced by space (Y), then
) ( )) ( ( Y u Y X f
dY
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where f(X(Y)) = conveyance loss of water from a canal at distance  Y;  u(Y) =
withdrawal at point  Y. In this way the net benefits of production become a
function of space.
One familiar with standard bioeconomic maximization problems
automatically knows the solution to this problem by “merely” replacing the
concept of time with space. A central planner charges for each unit of delivered
water a price that reflects marginal cost, which increases with distance from the
source as a result of conveyance costs and water losses. As compared to a
“postage stamp” water pricing policy typically used in practice by public agencies
in the U.S., where the charge is spatially insensitive, the optimal charge in the
spatial models encourages conservation and otherwise more disciplined use of
water the further and more expensive water use is from its source.
                                                
38 Tuck and Possingham (1994) illustrate the difference between the optimum and the two
poorly specified models.62
Anyone digging holes in the sand at the water’s edge knows that the walls
fall in more frequently as the gradient gets steeper. Others know how hard it is to
eradicate “pests” such as ferrets. Patches of  low density occupancy caused by
eradication in an otherwise uniformly hospitable habitat are very attractive to
entrants, much like profit signals entry. The greater the profit the more attractive
is entry. About the simplest way to characterize how biological populations
diffuse through space is to make the rate of diffusion of a species proportional to
the gradient of its density  (u). Clark (1990) considers a fishery in which the
movement is from offshore to inshore. Growth, F(X,u) depends on the distance
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where  s
2 is the “diffusion” coefficient. Then some objective is maximized
through the choice of effort to harvest u(X) constrained by (12). Of course, many
animals exhibit more complex behavior and then their movement must be
characterized in (X,Y) space. See Huffaker, et al. (1992) and Huffaker and Cooper
(1995).
Uncoordinated management of spatial or diffusion externalities is
diabolical. Suppose a property owner wanted to control a nuisance migratory
wildlife population, such as beavers whose dam building activity destroy
bottomland forest. Destroying beaver on one’s property merely makes the habitat
inviting for entrants. The more the manager destroys, the more attractive the63
property is for the outsiders [Bhat, et al. (1993)]. Contiguous landowners reap the
benefits of their neighbors’ momentary lower density at the expense of their
neighbor struggling to control the pests.
Sanchirico and Wilen (1999) have responded to the growing treatment by
natural scientists of spatial complexity, including patchy and heterogeneous
distributions of populations, with interconnections among and between patches.
They join such a model in an open access setting with harvesters and characterize
the rent dissipation process under a range of possible spatial bioeconomic
exploration cases. This can be just the introduction of a rich area for future
research.
Another distinctive feature of metapopulation models is that spatially
separated pools of fish provide insurance against extinction and invite a different
policy compared to prescriptions from a model in which there is a single
population. In sum, metapopulation models provide a quite different perspective
on policy issues.
Economic research has begun to recognize the spatial dimension in other
ways. Illustratively, the benefit of using a particular piece of land for a given
purpose can depend on the present and future uses of contiguous land. This
appropriately might be called a site externality. For example, preserved land can
provide to neighboring plots benefits from local climate effects, recreation,
erosion control and an enhanced view. [Albers, 1996].64
It is natural to generalize such a model to many sites affecting many other
sites. However, more intriguing is the idea that both the location and
configuration of land uses determine the value of each and all sites. Both the total
amount of wetlands and its spatial configuration affect their productivity
(assimilative capacity) [Bockstael, 1996]. Generally we would expect the net
benefits of biodiversity to decline with fragmentation holding acreage preserved
constant.39
Bockstael [1996] captures the spatial dimension in her hedonic valuation
model using shares of contiguous land in forests, crops or pasture. Fragmentation
is measured by the length of conflicting edges between residential and other types
of land use within a block.
VII. Measuring Economic Growth
It is commonly thought to be a good thing when a nation’s output or per
capita output, net of depreciation grows. Students are warned about the omissions
and commissions of measuring net national product but these qualifications have
played no prominent role when individual countries and international agencies
have reported and ranked growth statistics by country. Often, output or per capita
output is regarded as a welfare measure and used to rank country performance,
guide investment decisions by international organizations and so forth. The
usefulness of such indicators is diminished to the extent that errors of omission
                                                
39  However, “stepping stone” pieces of preserved land within fairly developed regions can
provide a viable migration route between two separate habitats, thus enabling gene flow essential
for population viability.65
and bias loom large. The open access nature of natural resources and the attendant
externalities, together with the failure to treat natural resources as capital has
created an attractive research area.
One of the first studies to adjust welfare measures to account for pollution
was by Nordhaus and Tobin (1973). More recently, environmentalists, including
ecologists concerned about sustainable development, have constituted a strong
force urging a reconsideration of how growth is measured. Countries have not
accounted for the depreciation of renewable resources. A country that grows 4
percent annually by producing timber and fish but does so by reducing its forests
and fish stocks by 4 percent is standing still. It is misleading for such an economy
to report it is growing, as resource intensive developing economies do, for it can
be the source of erroneous optimism.
While it is easy to establish that an inclusive measure of social well being
is:
NNP = Consumption + the value of the net change in all forms of
capital: physical, human, natural and environmental value of
environmental damages,
“The devil is in the details.” For example, should expenditures for pollution
control (“defensive expenditures”) be deducted?40
Notice that for a “cake eating” economy, one in which there is no
production, consumption is just offset by depreciation, so NNP=0. As this
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example illustrates, properly measured NNP tests the sustainable consumption of
an economy (Hartwick, 1990).
The concept of NNP is easier to grasp than it is to measure. Existing
stocks of fish, groundwater and other renewable resources are not readily
amenable to measurement. More difficult still is estimating the rental rate for
these resources. There is some hope when the shadow unit value (cost) of
environmental degradation can be equated to the marginal cost of abatement
facilities because these costs often are estimable. Unfortunately, as earlier
paragraphs make clear, missing and poorly defined property rights and complex
public policies and processes will continue to produce biased or non-existent
observable market prices.
Countries, international agencies and non-governmental organizations face
a dilemma. They can take the “high road,” publishing an “accurate” NDP figure,
providing an index of well being which has omitted critical but difficult to
measure changes in natural resource assets; or they can publish a more inclusive
measure which has been “contaminated” by components measured relatively
imperfectly. Green accounting is in its infancy.
Does green accounting make a significant difference? It should matter and
does for poor economies highly dependent on natural resources in general and
renewable resources, in particular. Failing to account for resource depletion can
loom large in social significance under these conditions. Research using Mexico
                                                                                                                                    
(1990) and Dasgupta (1995).67
data indicates a rate of conventional net capital formation of about 12 percent in
1985. When account is taken of deforestation, water, air and soil degradation, as
well as groundwater depletion, the rate of net investment was reduced to about
zero and was negative when account is taken for oil depletion [van Tongeran et al.
1993]. Similarly in Papua, New Guinea, consumption exceeded green national
product despite net conventional capital formation of approximately 10 percent in
1990 [Bartelmus et al. 1993]. The effect of green accounting on net domestic
product in other countries, summarized in Table 2, changes NDP up to 25 percent.
Green accounting can increase estimates of capital formation albeit measured
imperfectly, as it has in the United States, in part because the forest inventories
are increasing, 13 percent in a recent year [U.S. Department of Commerce
(1994)].
Green accounting retains little analytical mystery but a serious practice of
it in developed economies may have to wait for the economics profession to
express more confidence in non-use and some non-market methods of valuation.
These are necessary to value the changes in terrestrial and marine biodiversity,
visibility impairment, noise pollution and other qualitative changes in natural
resource assets that trouble people.
[Insert Table 2 here]
VIII. Irreversibility and Uncertainty
For about the past half century, economists interested in resources have
been concerned about the impact uncertainty has on the harvest profile of68
renewable resources. Reassuringly, there is a strong recognizable theme in the
answers although there is variety in the approaches to the problem. There is also a
difference in the emphasis given to irreversible decisions. How, after all, should
we think about decisions which could result in the destruction of species’ genes
and habitats?
The discussion begins with a most benign introduction of uncertainty by
way of certainty equivalence [Conrad and Clark (1987)]. Suppose the annual
recharge of a groundwater basin is subject to annual fluctuations. Under
restrictive but not scandalous assumptions,41 the manager of the water resource
has an extraction policy identical to a policy under certainty: less (more) than
annual recharge has to be pumped if the manager is restoring (depleting) water
supplies to the desired steady state level.
When there is more than the average amount of recharge, stocks are larger
than they should be so extraction should exceed average recharge and the linear
relationship insures progress to the steady state. The model merely corroborates
good sense. Difficulties with uncertainty arise not from the tractability of more
complex models but with the lack of useful information about the distribution of
the physical or biological variables.
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1965) was one of the first resource economists to write
about decisions with irreversible consequences, particularly species extinction.
When there is substantial uncertainty about the net benefits of preservation, he
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recommended a safe minimum standard below which a harvest policy should not
let  populations decline. The safe minimum standard resembles Weitzman’s
(1974b) quantity rule but only in spirit.  Ciriacy-Wantrup’s proposal for
discovering the safe minimum standard is qualitative although it involves
recognizable economic considerations such as the cost and availability of
substitutes and complements. Invoking the safe minimum standard keeps natural
resource capital higher than would occur in its absence. This result has a
deceptive ring of compatibility with advocates in the sustainability camp. Note,
however, that a higher sustained level of this renewable resource very likely
means a lower sustained level for its prey.
Unusually good things and bad things can happen but academics and
environmentalists are more disposed to study the latter. Common sense is a good
guide for the effect a catastrophic event has on resource extraction. Does the
positive probability of a volcano such as Mt. St. Helens cause nearby trees to be
cut sooner or later?  As long as harvest does not influence the “hazard’s”
occurrence, then introducing the chance of a bad thing occurring is equivalent to
increasing the discount rate which, in turn, calls for holding smaller stocks of
renewable resources—polluting the atmosphere, soil, lakes, etc.42 In the case of
forests, introducing the chance of a fire reduces the optimal rotation time because
the effective discount rate has increased. When the probability of disaster
                                                                                                                                    
additively.
42  A good discussion of the arbitrate equation portraying the price path of a resource under
uncertainty is in Dasgupta and Heal (1979).70
increases with, say, the stock of pollution [Clarke and Reed (1994)], then the
polluter’s behavior which affects the stock, impinges on the effective interest rate.
The probability of future prospective costs can be reduced by polluting less today.
When these expected savings in the future exceed the loss of forgoing
consumption today, the cause of more pollution, then it pays to decrease
consumption today to reduce the probability of future disaster.
In the last case, the agent’s actions today influence tomorrow’s probability
of a bad event. The most cited account of uncertainty and resources has a different
nature [Arrow and Fisher (1974)]. Actions by individuals today affect the scale of
gain or loss earned by tomorrow’s decisions. The context is how much
irreversible land development to undertake today for benefits today and maybe
tomorrow. It cannot be known until tomorrow, for example, whether today’s
development decision was a good idea. Under these conditions, the “quasi”43
option value of new information arriving at the end of today can only be captured
by developing less land in order to reap the favorable preservation benefits should
they occur in the future.
The difficulty of estimating the probabilities that new information will
arrive and the revised benefit (cost) that will ensue makes empirical estimates of
option value difficult. A recent attempt looks at land management decisions for
the Khao Yai National Park in Thailand [Albers,  et al., 1996.]44 Drawing on
                                                
43  The term “quasi” is found in the literature to distinguish it from an earlier literature on
another phenomenon referred to as option value. See Freeman (1993).
44  See also Albers (1996) for another treatment of uncertainty and irreversibility in a71
representative data for tropical forests in the region, the authors find that a myopic
maximizing manager (who follows the open loop formulation) would reduce the
amount of preserved land by one-half compared to the foresightful manager (who
solves the closed loop formulation). Following such a strategy, the wise manager
precludes making irreversible development decisions on the most fragile land in
order to capture future large preservation values, should they occur.
Treating uncertainty in the realm of biodiversity the way economists have
shines a unique light on a subject of increasing importance. Economists know
what many ecologists cannot bear to admit, that not all species can be saved in a
world of scarce resources. Suppose we are interested in maximizing genetic
diversity, leaving the weight attached to this goal among many competing
desiderata for future debate. What is the optimal pool of genetic capital?
Common economic sense tells us that uniqueness matters. A visual way to think
about this question is to imagine a decision  tree which portrays a sequence of
decisions, probabilities of occurrence and payoffs. Then visualize an evolutionary
tree which portrays the temporal pattern of species evolution—rotate it 90°—then
apply the solution for problems depicted by a decision tree to obtain the optimal
pool of genetic capital. Application requires choosing a measure of genetic
distance, an index of how distinct each species is from every other species;
probabilities of extinction and a discount rate. Whereas non-economists dedicated
to the preservation of biodiversity put a premium on saving that which has a high
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probability of extinction, economists recognize the trade-off between extinction
probabilities and uniqueness. A species with no close substitutes and low
probability of extinction may contribute marginal diversity far exceeding that of a
species with a high chance of extinction but one with many close neighbors.
Indeed that is exactly one of the findings in Weitzman’s study of cranes
[Weitzman (1993)]. The marginal contribution to diversity of the whooping crane
with the highest probability of extinction is less than one-half that of the sandhill
crane with the smallest probability of extinction. In this case we should allocate
scarce dollars to preserve the safest crane species, not the one most in danger of
extinction, if we think biodiversity is important.
IX. Conclusion
Looking backwards may create a foundation for looking forward. We have
not given the spatial dimension of renewable resources adequate attention and it is
unlikely that simply replacing time with space in the intertemporal models will
satisfactorily put the spatial dimension to rest. Refining and extending trade
models which include resources is one direction but there may be substantially
more to be explored by giving the population dynamics of resources a spatial
dimension. Indisputable economies of scale and non-convexities inherent in the
spatial dimension and behavior of important species invite analysis.
Understanding the role and function of ecosystems has come into high
fashion and is unlikely to disappear soon as public concern remains at a high level
about preserving species domestically and internationally, including mammals in73
the sea, marine sanctuaries and wilderness areas on land; about deforestation and
the loss of species and the list goes on. Common to these problems is
multidimensionality. Whereas the Endangered Species Act in the United States
has been addressed on a species-by-species basis in the past, increasingly
developers and conservationists are recommending setting aside habitat to
preserve many species.45 I think we confidently can expect economists to expand
the dimensions of their renewable resource models to handle this type of
increased complexity.
The need to better integrate economics and ecology is worthy. In his Mac
Arthur award lecture, the ecologist, David Tilman,  said that “ecology is a
discipline headed toward extinction” if it merely is a study of “species living in
habitats that experience minimal impact” (Tilman, 1997). Human impact is
ubiquitous and profound he asserts. How we do the integration is controversial.
Since economists have a comparative advantage in modeling behavior within a
neoclassical framework, that is likely to be the paradigm on which we embrace
ecological elements.
Renewable resources are not typically owned by a monopolist. Because
government plays such a prominent role, a competitive model is not descriptively
accurate nor is one with a benign dictator at the helm equating social marginal
benefits with cost. To better understand renewable resource management, we can
                                                
45  Given high transactions cost associated with permits for development and the uncertain
arrival of newly discovered species, developers forgo substantial areas believed to be rich in
habitat for species in return for the certainty of being able to develop other areas.74
anticipate more research than in the past on differential games, in which will be
incorporated more relevant market structure.
Economists don’t always accurately identify the productive arena for
debate. We spent decades polishing models with a charge prescription that had no
bearing on the real world. Some of our resources arguably would have been more
efficiently allocated toward studying individual transferable quota systems. We
used special models to argue against “subsidies” or “bribes” to polluters to bring
about optimal environmental quality, when some of that energy could have been
devoted to study optimal subsidy systems. Some of the actual subsidy systems
had wondrously terrible characteristics. Subsidies, in the international context, are
simply “bribes” or payments to make all parties better off.
If the economics discipline wishes to be part of policy debate about issues
such as global climate change, species preservation, fisheries and forest use
domestically and throughout the world, then it will have to study non-use values
which often are the crux of the economic issue and the discipline will have to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the methodology. To this end, an objective of
researchers should be to incorporate learning about how to improve the method of
non-use valuation itself into the design of the applied research pieces.
My penultimate recommendation is to devote more thought to the role of
renewable resources in growth models. Perhaps the marginal productivity of the
extension is low but we should know the reason for this conclusion rather than
assume it.75
Finally, with the advent of cheap computing, we should expect to see an
increase in applied research. If some of it or some of the cases bore more
resemblance to capturing actual objectives, technology and constraints, a
springboard might be provided for moving from analytical extremes toward
models which capture more accurately the behavioral, physical and institutional
features of our landscape. This can provide the basis for improved policy
recommendations.46
                                                
46  An excellent guideline for the research I have in mind is a study of the Pacific Halibut
fishery by Homan and Wilen (1997) in which regulators with biological goals play a game against
harvesters under open access conditions.76
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ECONOMIC VALUE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS**
                                                                                                                                         
ITQ Catch Value $US
Per Ton Per
            Level of Adoption                                         Capacity          Harvester                 
Iceland Nearly Complete (1990) 5100 93,300
(1993) 8100 114,400
New Zealand Nearly Complete  (1993/4) 5500* 69,200*
Greenland Substantial  (1993) 5100 84,400
Netherlands Substantial  (1993/4) 3000 132,800*
Australia Substantial  (1990) NA 66,200
Norway Non-Transferable Quotas  (1990) 2300 27,300
United Kingdom—None  (1990) 3700 33,900
United States—None  (1990) 2100 13,100
_______________
* Particularly uncertain estimates.
** Arnason (1996)TABLE 2
GREEN ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENTALLY ADJUSTED
NET NATIONAL PRODUCT (ENP) AS A FRACTION OF
NET NATIONAL PRODUCT
COUNTRY                                                     ENP/NNP(%)
Costa Rica (1970-89) 89-96
Indonesia (1971-84) 87
Japan (1985/90) 97-98






Sources:  See Bartelmus (1997), Norse and Saigal (1993).Figure 1a Figure 1b
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